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Thursday, December 10, 2015

DISTRICT FORUM CAN GRANT MAXIMUM OF 45 DAYS TIME TO THE OPPOSITE PARTY TO FILE HIS VERSION OR REPLY

Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court, answering a reference to it in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., has reiterated that the District Consumer Forum can grant a further period of 15 days (after the expiry of initial 30 days) to the opposite party for filing his version or reply and not beyond that.

ISSUE
The issue is within which time the opponent has to give his version to the District Forum in pursuance of a complaint filed by the complainant to the consumer forum under the provisions of section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act.

LAW
13. Procedure on admission of complaint – (1) ...............
(2) The District Forum shall, if the complaints admitted by it under Section 12 relates to goods in respect of which the procedure specified in sub-section (1) cannot be followed, or if the complaint relates to any services, –
(a) refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Forum;
(b) ---------------

DR. J.J. MERCHANT CASE DECIDED ON 2002
 In this case, a three judge bench of Apex Court had held “there is legislative mandate to the District Forum or the Commissions to dispose of the complaints as far as possible within prescribed time of three months by adhering strictly to the procedure prescribed under the Act. The opposite party has to submit its version within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the complaint by him and Commission can give at the most further 15 days for some unavoidable reasons to file its version.”

KAILASH CASE DECIDED ON 2005
 In this case, another Three judges bench, held that limit of 90 days, as prescribed by the proviso to Rule 1 of Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, is not mandatory,but directory in nature, and further time for filing reply can be granted, if the circumstances are such that require grant of further time for filing the reply. In this case, Dr JJ Merchant case was also discussed and it was held that the observations made in that case, to the extent it deal with the Rule 1 of Order 8 of CPC was obiter.

VIEW HELD (EARLIER DECISION PREVAILS)
The Apex court said that since the issue discussed in Dr J.J. Merchant case is identical to the issue in the present case, it holds the field and not the latter view in Kailash case, since it deals with CPC provisions.

Also the law laid down in the Dr. J.J. Merchant case was decided on 2002, which is earlier in time and will prevail, but even a Bench of coordinate strength of this Court, which had decided the case of Kailash (decided on 2005) was bound by the view taken by a three-Judge Bench in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant. As per the law laid down the subsequent Court ought to have respected the view expressed by the earlier Court. The established legal positions which are summarized below cannot be ignored:

(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.

(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.

(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) The above said rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and

(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing.

Prepared by: S. Hemanth

Tuesday, December 1, 2015

WOMEN RIGHT OVER STRIDHANA PROPERTIES

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhatacharjee Vs. Sarathi Choudhury and another (reported in 2015 AIR SCW 6386) have decided on the claim made by women over her Stridhana properties, the apex court observed who is the “aggrieved person” as defined under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and whether the claim was barred by limitation and the relationship of husband and wife when there is a decree of judicial separation.

Stridhana properties means: Stridhana properties are properties gifted to the girl before her marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of giving farewell or thereafter. It is her absolute property with all rights to dispose at her own pleasure. Husband has no control over her Stridhana properties, he may use it during the time of his distress but nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore the same or its value to his wife. The Stridhana properties are not joint properties of the wife and husband, the husband will have no right or title over the Stridhana property.

Domestic violence includes Economic Abuse: The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is the beneficial as well as assertively affirmative enactment for the realisation of the constitutional rights of women and to ensure that they do not become victims of any kind of domestic violence. The definition of “Domestic Violence” covers a range of violence including “Economic Abuse”.

Background before appealing to Supreme Court: The appellant (woman/wife) having lost the battle for getting her Stridhan back from her husband, before the learned Magistrate on the ground that the claim preferred under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was not entertainable as she had ceased to be an "aggrieved person" under Section 2(a) of the 2005 Act and further that the claim as put forth was barred by limitation; preferred an appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge who concurred with the view expressed by the learned Magistrate. Subsequently approached the High Court of Tripura, Agartala in Criminal Revision, the High Court declined to interfere with the lower court findings, consequently wife preferred appeal, by special leave before the Supreme Court.

Difference between decree for divorce and judicial separation: There is a distinction between a decree for divorce and decree of judicial separation; in the former, there is a severance of status and the parties do not remain as husband and wife, whereas in the later, the relationship between husband and wife continues and legal relationship continues as it has not been snapped. Therefore wife does not cease to be an “aggrieved person” because of decree of judicial separation. Once decree for divorce is passed the parties become different, but that is not so when there is a decree for judicial separation.

Continuing offence: The retention of Stridhana by the husband or any other family members is a continuing offence.  Neither the husband nor any other family members can have any right over the Stridhana and they remain the custodians. Wife as long as she remain the status of the “aggrieved person” can file for her right or claim under 2005 Act for her stridhana properties. In the above case, the wife had submitted the application on 22.05.2010 and the said authority had forwarded the same on 01.06.2010 to the Magistrate. In the application, the wife had mentioned that the husband had stopped payment of monthly maintenance from January 2010 and, therefore, she had been compelled to file the application for Stridhana. Regard being had to the said concept of "continuing offence" and the demands made, the Hon’ble Supreme held that the application was not barred by limitation and the courts below as well as the High Court had fallen into a grave error by dismissing the application being barred by limitation.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the concerned magistrate to proceed with the application filed by the appellant wife under provision of section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Prepared by: S. Hemanth